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Russian Federation imposed sanction on 62 Canadian citizens

Russian Federation imposed sanction on 62 Canadian citizens

 

Dhaka August 06 2022 :

 

Foreign Ministry Statement on imposing personal sanctions on certain Canadian nationals on August 05 2022.

In response to the most recent expansion of personal sanctions by Canada on June 27 and July 7, 2022, which this time targeted the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in addition to officials, journalists and experts deemed undesirable by Ottawa, a ban on entry to the Russian Federation is imposed on 62 Canadian citizens.

In view of the particularly hostile actions by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s regime, intended to insult not only the multiethnic and multifaith people of Russia but also Orthodox Christian believers across the world, including Canada, the malicious activities targeting the Russian world and our traditional values by those banned from entry were taken into account as the stop list was being compiled.

Below are the names of Canadian citizens included in the permanent stop list:

  1. Raymond J. de Souza, a Catholic priest, editor-in-chief of Convivium Magazine;
  2.  Maeva Proteau, Director of Communications at the Office of Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada;
  3. Adrien Blanchard, Press Secretary, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada;
  4.  Tyler Meredith, Director of Economic Strategy and Planning for the Deputy PM and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  5. Cameron McNeill, Senior Communications Adviser for the Deputy PM and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  6.  Ani Dergalstanian, Speechwriter/Communications Advisor at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  7. Tyler Norman, Advisor, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  8. Erin Woods, Special Assistant, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  9.  Gianluca Tatone, Planning and Co-ordination Assistant, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  10.  Douglas Wong, Policy Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  11. Yash Nanda, Policy Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  12.  Nicholas Mahoney, Policy Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  13.  Farees Nathoo, Director of Parliamentary Affairs and Issues Management, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  14.  Alexann Kropman, Legislative Assistant, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  15.  Nasser Haidar, Special Assistant, Issues Management, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  16.  Anthony Laporte, Director, Strategy and Outreach, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  17.  Shannon Zimmermann, Director of Operations, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  18.  Joshua Arless, Senior Manager for Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  19. Marco Paoli, Special Assistant, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  20. Galen Richardson, Senior Regional Advisor, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  21. Hannah Wilson, Senior Regional Desk, Prairies & North, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  22.  Malcolm McEachern, Senior Regional Advisor, Atlantic, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  23. Cedric Sarault, staff member, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  24. Guillaume Bertrand, Communications Advisor, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia;
  25. Jessica Eritou, Communications Advisor, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  26. Jesse Bartsoff, Special Assistant, Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Canada Chrystia Freeland;
  27. Ian Scott, Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC);
  28.  Caroline J. Simard, Vice-Chairperson, Broadcasting, CRTC;
  29. Christianne Laizner, Vice-Chairperson, Telecommunications, CRTC;
  30. Claude Doucet, Secretary General, CRTC;
  31. Fiona Gilfillan, Executive Director, Telecommunications, CRTC;
  32. Steven Harroun, Chief Compliance and Enforcement Officer, CRTC;
  33. Scott Hutton, Chief of Consumer, Research and Communications CRTC;
  34. Stephen Millington, Senior General Counsel, CRTC;
  35. Scott Shortliffe, Executive Director, Broadcasting, CRTC;
  36. Elena Krueger, President of Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC)-Saskatchewan;
  37. Tara Katrusiak Baran, Policy Advisor, UCC;
  38. Inna Platonova, President of the UCC Calgary Branch, Alberta;
  39. Olenka Reshitnyk-Bastian, Coordinator, UCC Ottawa Branch;
  40. Carol Guimond, President of the Windsor Branch of the Ukrainian National Federation, Ontario;
  41.  Leisha Nazarewich, President of the Windsor Branch, Ontario;
  42.  Paul Deegan, President and CEO, News Media Canada;
  43. Aurel Braun, political scientist, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development;
  44.  Garry Keller, vice-president of StrategyCorp, former Chief of Staff, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada;
  45. Eugen Dan Ciuriak, Consulting Economist, С.D.Ноwе Institute;
  46. Michael Charles Wright, Head, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command;
  47. Steven James Hunter, Deputy Commander, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command;
  48.  Pierre Leblanc, former Commander, Canadian Forces Northern Area;
  49. Trevor John Cadieu, retired lieutenant-general;
  50. Rick J. Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff;
  51. Mark Lamarre, Chief Executive Officer, Seaspan Shipyards;
  52. Jason Alejandro Monahan, Vice President and General Manager, General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada;
  53.  Roman Shimonov, board member of the Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce; CEO and founder at Roshel Defence Solutions;
  54.  Maria Tkacheva, Vice President, Roshel;
  55.  Dmitry Gorin, Senior Mechanical Engineer, Roshel;
  56. Rafal Rohozinski, Principal, SecDev Group and CEO of Zeropoint Security; Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI);
  57. Gwynne Dyer, columnist;
  58. Dennis Kovtun, observer, Тhе Hill Times;
  59. Alexander Lanoszka, Political scientist;
  60. Elie Mikhael Nasrallah, columnist;
  61. Brent Hawkes, Protestant pastor, LGBT activist;
  62. Chantal Jennifer Kreviazuk, singer and composer.

Considering the new Russophobic sanctions Canada keeps churning out, further response measures by Russia will be announced shortly. 

 

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov briefed on ASEAN ministerial meetings

 

 

 

Dhaka August 06 2022 :

 

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions following ASEAN ministerial meetings, Phnom Penh, August 5, 2022

Yesterday, we held a Russia-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting. This is an annual event. We reviewed the implementation of the agreements reached at the Russia-ASEAN summit in the autumn of 2021 held via videoconference. The summit adopted an important document – the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to implement the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Russian Federation strategic partnership (2021–2025).

All participants confirmed their desire to work in the areas set forth in this document, including a dialogue between security councils on enhancing stability in the region, countering terrorist activities and drug trafficking, and on ensuring international cybersecurity. These are major areas of our military-political cooperation.

We expressed satisfaction with the fact that the first-ever Russia-ASEAN naval exercises took place at the end of 2021 in Indonesian waters. They were successful and well received in the countries concerned.

We noted that the annual upgrade courses for officers in related specialties, conducted by the Russian Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service, are playing a useful role in enhancing the potential of ASEAN countries in countering new challenges and threats. It was pointed out that despite the pandemic, Russia-ASEAN trade recorded a substantial growth in 2021 and exceeded $20 billion. Naturally, this is nowhere near the limit. There are areas for further work – financial mechanisms and greater use of national currencies in mutual transactions, to name a few. We also talked about the good prospects that are opening in the digital economy, healthcare, modern technology, the nuclear energy industry and space exploration. Russia has bilateral programmes with a number of ASEAN countries in these areas. All participants are interested in developing dialogues in these areas with a view to practical cooperation at the level of the ASEASN 10 as well.

2022 was declared the Year of Russia – ASEAN Scientific and Technical Cooperation. This clearly shows how our initiatives are being implemented. At our meeting, we approved a plan for the development of tourism between Russia and ASEAN until 2024, as well as a work plan in education until 2026. Another important element in the development of our partnership with the Association is the ten countries’ focus on expanding contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and with the Eurasian Economic Union.

We will continue holding the ASEAN dialogue on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. The June meeting in this format was met with a positive response. In September, several ASEAN countries plan to attend the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, as well as the 2nd International Tiger Conservation Forum (this Russian initiative is highly popular).

In addition to the Russia-ASEAN meeting, a ministerial-level event took place that is held every year as part of the East Asia Summits. The discussion could not but touch upon the current, quite serious geopolitical processes in the region, which negatively impact the ASEAN-centric architecture of cooperation that has been being built for years and that includes ASEAN’s meetings with partners, such as the mechanism of East Asia Summits, the ASEAN Regional Forum on security (also initiated by the ASEAN member states), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting with the heads of the military departments of partner countries.

These open formats that operate based on consensus and mutual respect are threatened by the activities of the US and its closest allies aimed at creating narrow-group structures, including military and political ones, like the AUKUS alliance (Australia, Great Britain and the US). There is a tendency to use this bloc to promote NATO interests in the Indo-Pacific region. NATO members do not hide this: at the North Atlantic Alliance summit held in June in Madrid, NATO proclaimed its global responsibility in the field of security, and promoted the indivisibility of the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. The emerging militaristic moods in today’s Japan are also used for this purpose. Japan, as well as New Zealand and Australia, are being pulled into activities related to the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure in the region and the formation of supply chains for the needs of the alliance’s military activities.

In addition to military-political issues, the Americans and their allies are trying to take many other issues in the region beyond open ASEAN-related formats. I am referring to the creation of “closed clubs” to discuss naval security, even though ASEAN has long discussed this in its own format. In parallel, narrow format structures are being created on cybersecurity, where discussions overlap with the ongoing talks in universal ASEAN platforms.

Recently, the United States initiated a new organisation – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is an obvious alternative to the ASEAN-initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The US has invited only seven of ten ASEAN members to join. This approach points to exclusivity rather than inclusivity. The countries invited to these associations are those that will not create too many problems or emphasise their views – they will agree with the position of a country that is making these “responsible decisions” almost single-handedly.

We have described our evaluation of what is going on. Without any politicising we have emphasised the importance of practical cooperation in the region, including countering the risks of the pandemic. This threat is not going away any time soon. Even if we manage the spread of the coronavirus, new pandemics will crop up. Everyone agrees on this. The Russian initiative suggests working together on this at East Asian Summits and enjoys broad support from the region’s countries. To help the economy recover after the pandemic-related restrictions, we suggested allocating special support for tourism. We have a plan to hold a meeting of the heads of tourism agencies from the countries taking part in the East Asian Summits.

The volunteer movement is yet another direction that grew distinctly from the pandemic. Everyone remembers the volunteer movement in Russia. We highly appreciate the contribution made by volunteers and civil society representatives to support doctors. Our proposal to establish a relevant regional movement received much interest. I hope we will see the practical implementation of this. We have discussed a number of other initiatives, including cybersecurity and other areas for cooperation.

The main point is to understand the current situation as a confrontation between universal ASEAN-centric formats and the new associations that the United States is trying hard to introduce into the region as an alternative to universal methods of discussion and consensus-based decision-making.

Question: What do you think is the main result for Russia following your visit to Myanmar and Cambodia? Can the southeastern “wind of change” be used for Russia “to set sail”?

Sergey Lavrov: I believe that there are enough Siberian and Far Eastern winds. The “winds” here are more likely to be a sort of gales which are pretty rough on the ASEAN platform.

We have reaffirmed our full support for maintaining the principles used by the ten nations for decades to build up cooperation and interaction formats based on equality, respect for each other’s interests and decision-making exclusively by consensus. Attempts to introduce bloc-type approaches to the region are subjecting these principles to a grave test. The mere fact of this year’s public statement by NATO on its global ambitions (everyone had suspected them of this before, though) to have a dominant military-political role in the region marks a serious qualitative change in the situation. Southeast Asian countries, which traditionally abstain from abrupt moves and sharply worded statements, are now gravely concerned about a new arena of confrontation in the making here.

There have been a number of “sparking” statements today, primarily regarding the developments around the Taiwan Strait following the visit by Speaker of the House of Representatives of the US Congress Nancy Pelosi. We have heard fairly strong reactions from our Chinese partners whom we support. In response, the US and Japan stated that this is none of the PCR’s business and that the policy they had declared on supporting the One China principle does not mean Beijing’s permission is required to visit Taiwan. It is odd logic.

And of course, the topic of Ukraine came up. Our US colleagues and some of their closest allies did not say anything new. We reminded them how things had been unfolding and what a disruptive and provocational role the US and NATO had been playing for many years to create a situation in which living in Ukraine would become unbearable for Russians. Anything connected with the Russian language, Russian education and media has been banned in Ukraine whereas Nazi theory and practices are being imposed. Kiev was derailing the implementation of the Minsk agreements with acquiescence from Washington and Brussels. Ukraine was being flooded with weapons, they had plans to build military and naval bases aimed at containing the Russian Federation.

Antony Blinken repeated the mantra today that states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty are sacred. The US Secretary of State referred to the UN Charter for the first time in many years. Until recently the Americans spoke exclusively about the rules-based order rather than international law or the UN Charter principles. Obviously, now they appeal to the UN Charter so as to justify subversive actions the US has been taking to create a threat to Russia from Ukrainian territory.

It would make sense to speak about that again citing new examples of not only arming Ukraine but also the US military’s direct involvement in targeting the weapons systems against the Russian Federation and civilians in Donbass.

It is crucial for us that the ASEAN region remain an area of cooperation. We will vigorously advocate for the underlying principles the Association relied on to build up the components of this open and equitable regional architecture.

Question: Yesterday, John Kirby said that Secretary of State Antony Blinken would try to buttonhole you on the sidelines of ASEAN for a discussion of the situation with Brittney Griner and a prisoner exchange. Did Antony Blinken succeed in contacting you? Are you ready to discuss a prisoner swap with the US Secretary of State in the future?

Sergey Lavrov: Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the US National Security Council John Kirby might have forgotten to assign Antony Blinken his task. Today, the Secretary of State was the next nearest to me at the conference table. I did not see any interest in buttonholing me. All my buttons remain where they belong.

I already had the opportunity to express my opinion on the issue relating to people sentenced to prison in Russia and the United States. There is a dedicated channel that the presidents [of the two countries] agreed to establish. No matter what is said in public, the channel remains an option. If Americans decide again to resort to public diplomacy and make high-profile statements about the steps they are going to take, it is their choice – I would even say, their problem – because Americans often fail to follow agreements on conducting quiet professional work not only on this topic but on many other issues as well. That’s it.

We are ready to discuss this matter but only through the channel that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Joe Biden agreed on. 

Question: On August 3, 2022, Azerbaijani troops violated the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan talked about the need to specify the activities of the Russian peacekeeping mission by signing a separate memorandum as a supplement to the existing trilateral agreements. What is Russia’s position on this issue and does Russia plan contacts with Yerevan and Baku to discuss it anytime soon?

Sergey Lavrov: It is difficult for me to answer this question. We did not see proposals that Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan wants to submit for discussion in the context of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno- Karabakh. I would not start speculating now.  Any party to the agreements reached by the presidents of Russian and Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia can come up with new initiatives supplementing the agreements. So far, we have not seen any.

Question: What are the prospects for the talks on the Iran nuclear deal resuming in Vienna? The other day, the Russian President’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said that a number of the West’s unfriendly actions towards Russia could affect parameters of a future agreement on the Iran deal. Could you explain what specific problems may arise in the context of implementing the JCPOA?

Sergey Lavrov: We have already spoken about the prospects for concluding agreements to resume the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme. Our position is very clear. It never changed. The document should be restored exclusively in the form in which it was approved by the UN Security Council: without any “add-ons” or “deletions.” Now we can see the Americans are trying to turn a modified plan into a new agreement, while the Iranians insist that everything be preserved as it was approved in 2015. I think that Iran’s position is completely legitimate. The United States withdrew from the plan that everyone else, and the Americans themselves, once approved. Since Washington tried to destroy it, then it must withdraw its position, returning to the original agreements. Now the problem is this.

Question: The traditional UN General Assembly will be held in September. Will Russia be represented at it? Or will Western sanctions create an obstacle to the attendance of the Russian delegation?

Sergey Lavrov: Russia cannot but be represented in the United Nations. Western countries have no rights to make decisions on these issues. As for the level of our presence: whether it will be a delegation from Moscow or our American “colleagues” will manage, in the spirit of their “love of freedom,” to forbid the delegation from attending – time will tell.

The United States, as the host country of the headquarters, has a legal obligation to the UN and all members of the Organisation: to do everything so that any member state of the UN can normally and comfortably participate in the work of all bodies of the Organisation. The United States shirks this duty.

Recently I sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who is obliged to seek “decent” behaviour from the host country of the headquarters. The agreement between the United Nations and the United States on the location of the UN headquarters provides for the Secretary-General to initiate arbitration in the event that Washington violates its obligations. For several years now, the Secretary-General has for some reason been unable or unwilling to exercise this right. We remind him that he has such a right and should not just “keep it in the pocket”. It needs to be actively used. We began to issue reminders of this right when the Obama Administration, in the last weeks of its time in the White House, criminally confiscated diplomatic property from us, including the premises where our Mission to the United Nations was located.

Hopefully, the United States will understand that for its own reputation in the international arena, it is important to avoid the impression that Washington is afraid of discussions, trying to block channels for disputes, discussions and negotiations for countries whose position is contrary to the American one. Truth is born in argument.

Today I gave examples of the Americans creating associations in the Indo-Pacific region (as they call it), in which only like-minded states can participate and no one will object to the United States. Such formations are doomed to megalomania and have no prospects, since they will not be able to reflect the entire range of opinions existing in the region.

The same goes for the United Nations. We don’t want any UN member country to experience any problems with fully participating in the activities of the Organisation.

 

Nuclear disarmament is at the forefront of the international agenda : Andrey Belousov

 

Dhaka August 06 2022 :

 

Statement by Mr. Andrey Belousov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I, Nuclear Disarmament) on 5 August 2022.

Mr. Chairman,

First of all, we would like to draw attention to the working paper of the Russian Federation entitled “Nuclear disarmament: an area of shared responsibility” containing views on a number of aspects of nuclear disarmament issues, which is available on the websites of the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.56).

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament is at the forefront of the international agenda. Despite visible progress in strategic arms reduction, the nuclear powers are accused of almost sabotaging their disarmament obligations. We cannot agree with this interpretation, at least with regard to the Russian Federation.

Russia seeks to make its practical contribution to freeing the world from the threat posed by WMDs, including nuclear weapons. We are committed to the noble goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In fully complying with our international obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we bear our fair share of responsibility for preserving peace and strengthening global security.

As a result of reductions, the total strategic arms capacity of the Russian Federation has been successively reduced by 85 percent from its peaks in the 1980s. The Russian Federation has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) by three-quarters of what the USSR had in 1991. All NSNWs have been transferred to the non-deployed category, are located exclusively within the national territory, and are concentrated in centralized storage facilities with the highest security regime, which provides a reliable guarantee against accidental or unauthorized use, not to mention theft.

The Russian Federation continues to fulfill its obligations under the 2010 START Treaty without exemptions or reservations. As of 1 March 2021, Russia possessed 526 deployed strategic offensive means of delivery and 1,474 warheads attributed to them under the Treaty. The aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers as of that date was 761. The limiting levels we have achieved are significantly lower than those stipulated in the START Treaty. We publish quantitative data on levels of strategic offensive weapons for greater transparency. In November 2019, the Russian Federation held a demonstration for the U.S. side of the Avangard missile system with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. This step serves as further confirmation of the strict fulfillment of our obligations under the Treaty, aimed primarily at ensuring the viability and effectiveness of its implementation.

The United States has announced that some of its strategic offensive weapons have been converted and can no longer be used for nuclear weapons. However, in the context of the implementation of the START Treaty, we cannot yet confirm this. As a result, the United States actually possesses more nuclear-weapon-delivery vehicles than required by the Treaty. This exceedance allows the United States to build up its strategic nuclear capability by about 1,200 nuclear warheads in the shortest possible time. We continue to work towards resolving this issue.

At Russia’s initiative, the START Treaty was extended for five years in February 2021. By agreement between the Presidents of Russia and the United States, a composite dialogue on strategic stability was initiated. Its key objective was to lay the foundations for future arms control and risk reduction measures. We managed to agree on the parameters for building such work. Its ultimate goal, as we saw it, was to develop a new “security equation” that would take into account all factors of strategic stability and encompass both offensive and defensive nuclear and non-nuclear weapons capable of meeting strategic challenges.

However, the positive achievements have not been implemented due to the U.S. policy of achieving military superiority while completely ignoring Russia’s “red lines” in the field of security. Washington used Russia’s rebuff to the attempts to put us in a vulnerable position as a pretext to “freeze” the strategic dialogue. However, in the absence of cooperation, strategic stability challenges and contradictions only accumulate and intensify, and the system of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and agreements that has served as the foundation for international security for decades continues to be subjected to unprecedented tests. We hope that the understanding of the objective need to avoid total chaos in strategic affairs and to prevent the development of events in the worst-case scenario will sooner or later prevail.

Mr. Chairman,

Against this background, it is not surprising that many states are increasingly expressing serious concerns about the growing nuclear risks and uncertain prospects for nuclear disarmament. This theme is becoming more and more apparent in the current NPT review cycle as well.

We note that the possibility of implementing ideas concerning nuclear risk reduction should be considered in the general context of moving toward reducing confrontational potential and preventing crises that could lead to direct military clashes involving nuclear-weapon states.

In this regard, we would like to draw the attention of delegations to the working paper of the P-5, in which last December a common vision on this issue was outlined, and to which we remain committed.

More generally, in our view, amid global turbulence and international political fragmentation, there is a demand, primarily within the NPT framework, for respectful and engaged dialogue as the only possible means of overcoming disagreements, increasing the level of trust, and finding common ground.

As for nuclear disarmament itself, we are convinced that there are no shortcuts. It is impossible to achieve real progress in this area simply by outlawing nuclear weapons.

The international security situation is such that the consolidated efforts of the “NPT community” to create a favorable global climate for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and to make this process consistent and sustainable are now particularly needed to make progress toward this goal. In this respect, the contribution of each NPT state party is valuable. Non-nuclear-weapon states, along with nuclear-weapon states, should contribute in deed, not in word, to the overall reduction of international tensions, the promotion of stability, and a realistic global disarmament agenda, especially in the implementation of Article VI in its entirety.

Practical progress in disarmament can only be achieved by consensus and by pursuing a path towards calibrated and phased reductions in the context of Article VI of the NPT, as well as by respecting the mandatory requirement to maintain strategic balance based on the principle of equal security. We respect the views of those who advocate the immediate and unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the attempts to impose on countries possessing nuclear weapons the speedy elimination of their arsenals are clearly futile in isolation from existing strategic realities and legitimate security interests of each of these countries.

The Russian Federation is open to all constructive ideas for multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament and on strengthening international security and stability. Discussions on the topic should be based on consensus and respect the legitimate interests of all participants in the process. Attempts to force anyone to participate in them are counterproductive. In our view, the engagement in such discussions of France and the United Kingdom, as NATO allies of the United States, would be of priority. They possess nuclear arsenals not limited by any international agreements, which we have to take into account when working on matters of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. We also take into account the plans announced by London to increase the number of nuclear warheads.

At the same time, we would like to draw the attention of participants in the Conference to the fact that NATO openly defines itself as a nuclear alliance, which was recently reconfirmed by its members at the end of the June summit in Madrid. U.S. nuclear weapons are still on the territory of non-nuclear allied states. Practical scenarios for its use involving non-nuclear-weapon states are being exercised within NATO. The anti-Russian character of such activities has recently been, in fact, stated by the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany. For his part, the NATO Secretary General has publicly allowed the deployment of American nuclear weapons in European countries to the east of Germany.

Such irresponsible actions not only continue to be a significant factor affecting international and European security, but also increase the risk of nuclear conflict and generally hamper nuclear disarmament efforts. We have repeatedly called for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons to national territory, the elimination of the infrastructure for their deployment in Europe, and the cessation of NATO “joint nuclear missions”.

This policy of the North Atlantic Alliance raises even more concerns about the creation of the AUKUS partnership by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Despite claims that no nuclear warheads will be transferred to Australia, the military infrastructure of nuclear-weapon states is in fact expected to be located on its territory. In addition, the planned acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered submarines, which are effectively weapons of unlimited range, is forcing other countries to consider such a massive build-up of its military capabilities. This raises the question of the goals that the participants in this format of cooperation set for themselves. They need to clarify the situation and provide complete information on the objectives of their interaction, which are clearly broader than what is on the surface. Overall, we are concerned about the trend towards political-military groupings, whose activities may have negative implications for strategic stability and far-reaching implications for regional and global security.

Mr. Chairman,

In the current circumstances, it is more critical than ever that the nuclear powers behave with restraint and responsibility. The Russian Federation is strongly convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The commitment to this principle was reaffirmed by Russia and the United States in the Presidential Joint Statement of 16 June 2021, as well as by Russia and China in the Joint Statement of 28 June 2021 on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Furthermore, Russia and China took a further step by stating that every effort should be made to prevent any armed conflicts between states with military nuclear capabilities.

This commitment was reaffirmed on 3 January 2022 by the leaders of the P-5 in the Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. One of the key points of the document is the intention to continue seeking diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. It is important that each of the nuclear-weapon states follow the provisions of this statement in their entirety.

Russia is consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its Military Doctrine. Russia’s policy in this area is aimed exclusively at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. At the same time, priority is given to the implementation of a set of political and diplomatic measures to prevent aggression. In the military area, the emphasis is shifted to non-nuclear means as part of the non-nuclear deterrence system.

In accordance with the provisions of the current Military Doctrine, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in two exceptional cases: in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.

The vision of our country of the essence of nuclear deterrence, the definitions of military risks and threats to be neutralized through nuclear deterrence, are specified in the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. This document, issued in June 2020, details the provisions of the Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence and allows the general public to learn in detail about our approaches to their implementation.

Russia’s state policy in the area of nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive in nature and is aimed at maintaining its nuclear capability at a level that provides guaranteed protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and at preventing aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. Furthermore, Russian doctrine documents do not define any state as a military adversary of Russia. This gives us grounds to implement nuclear deterrence measures only against those states and military coalitions that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and at the same time possess nuclear weapons or significant combat potential of general purpose forces that can be used for aggression against our country.

It is also worth noting that the possession of nuclear weapons, primarily for deterrence purposes, is the only possible response to certain significant external threats to the Russian Federation. The development of the situation around Ukraine confirms the validity of our concerns in this area. By grossly violating the principle of equal and indivisible security, the NATO bloc has made a bet on malicious expansion aimed at weakening our country. At the same time, the United States and its allies rejected the Russian initiative to work out legally binding agreements that would guarantee the restoration of predictability and stability on Russia’s western borders. The countries of the “collective West” used our forced response to protect our external security contour as a pretext to move into a fierce hybrid confrontation with Russia, dangerously balancing on the edge of open military conflict. Under these circumstances, abandoning nuclear weapons would not only drastically weaken our national security but would also be able to provoke a serious intensification of threats with the risk of further escalation up to a large-scale military confrontation.

Mr. Chairman,

The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty on 2 August 2019 nullified the international legal prohibitions on the deployment of land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missile weapons.

In order to prevent a new devastating nuclear arms race, the Russian Federation has made a unilateral commitment not to be the first to deploy systems subject to the Treaty in the relevant regions unless similar U.S.-made missiles are deployed in there. We call on the U.S. and its allies to undertake similar commitments.

On 26 October 2020, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in his Statement on Additional Steps to De-escalate the Situation in Europe in the Context of the Termination of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reiterating the initiative on reciprocal moratoria, invited all parties concerned to consider specific options of reciprocal verification measures to address existing concerns. Our initiatives remain in force. Please give them your utmost attention.

We reiterate with a sense of responsibility that Russia has never had and does not have intermediate- and shorter-range land-based missiles. To assert otherwise means to create a deliberately false picture and shield those who are truly responsible for the breakdown of the INF Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

In recent years, nuclear disarmament verification has been actively promoted in international forums as the hottest topic, and some have presented it as a panacea for all troubles, capable of overcoming all obstacles on the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Russian position on this issue is well known; it has been tested by time and experience in implementing disarmament agreements. We are convinced that verification procedures cannot be considered in isolation from specific arms reduction and limitation agreements and must be consistent with the subject matter and scope of the limitations contained therein. Therefore, we do not consider the idea of developing procedures and technologies for nuclear disarmament verification in advance for their possible use in some speculative future arrangements to be reasonable from a logical, pragmatic, or negotiating perspective. In fact, it is a waste of time and resources for a result that knowingly cannot be implemented in practice.

That said, of course, in the event of substantive work on possible future arms control arrangements to which Russia will be a party, we will pay due attention to the verification aspects.

Mr. Chairman,

We would like to stress once again that the Russian Federation fulfills all of its nuclear disarmament obligations strictly and fully.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 

Ukrainian armed forces shelled the Zaporozhye NPP with large-caliber artillery

 

Dhaka August 06 2022 :

 

Statement by Mr. Igor Vishnevetskii, Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation, at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 10th NPT Review Conference on August 06 2022.

Mr. President,

Our delegation would like to take this opportunity to deliver an urgent message.

Right during our meeting, alarming information is coming about the situation at the Zaporozhye NPP.

Just two hours ago, the Ukrainian armed forces shelled the Zaporozhye NPP with large-caliber artillery. The shells hit the facility distributing electricity to the plant, which is fraught with the risk of its blackout. There is a fire in the area of the shelling as pipelines were damaged.

At the same time, the Ukrainian armed forces shelled the city of Energodar, several kilometers from the Zaporozhye NPP, where the plant’s personnel live. It is still not known what the consequences of this shelling are and whether there are any human casualties. All of this is being figured out.

According to the information we receive in real time, repair crews cannot reach the scene of the fire as there is still a possibility of artillery shelling. The situation is extremely alarming, fraught with the risk of a man-made disaster at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant. If the accident happens, it will be akin to Chernobyl. This situation concerns European states in the first place. In this connection, we would like to appeal to international organizations – the UN, the IAEA – as well as to countries that have an influence on the Kiev regime to take action so that the shelling of nuclear power plants stops immediately. Otherwise, the consequences will be hard to predict.

Thank you.

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